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A BALANCED DIET OF
FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
Joel GoraI
Today, I will discuss the First Amendment2 cases before
the Supreme Court last Term. 3 The cases were what I would call a
"balanced diet" of First Amendment cases. Two of the cases
involved regulation of material with a sexual content;4 one case
involved zoning of places that sell materials having a sexual
content;5 another was a commercial speech case,6 (there is one of
those almost every term). The Court also heard a good old-
fashioned park permit case 7 and a good old fashioned door-to-door
canvassing case.8  Another case involved a right to petition the
government, including the right to speak through litigation.9 There
was also a campaign speech case. 0 And last, but certainly not
least, perhaps the best known First Amendment case of the term, a
church-state case." It would be possible to teach an entire First
Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Pomona
College; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law. I would like to express
my thanks and appreciation to Nicole Kaplan, Brooklyn Law School Class of
2003, for her outstanding work on this article.
2 U.S. Const. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech..
3 October Term, 2001.
4 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564 (2002).
5 Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
6 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
7 Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (reviewing conditions
under which cities can require a permit before you use a park or street for a
parade).
8 Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
(reviewing the extent to which local government can regulate door-to door
solicitation and activities).
9 BE & K Construction v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 122 S. Ct. 2390 (2002).
This is predominantly a labor regulation case with strong First Amendment
consequences.
10 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002)
(involving candidates for judicial office running for election to those offices).
"1 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002). In this
well-known voucher decision case, the Court upheld in a five to four decision a
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Amendment course off the menu of cases that the Court heard this
past Term.
The Court showed quite a balance in its decisions. Of the
nine cases noted, the First Amendment claimant prevailed five
times 12 and the Court rejected or deflected the First Amendment
claim four times.1 3 Reflecting a similar pattern, there were many
five to four decisions, with the Court sharply divided on the
specific issue.14  The conservatives tended to be in favor of
political and commercial speech;' 5 the liberals tended to be in
favor of sexual speech. 16  I invite you to draw your own
conclusions from this.
ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH COALITION
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition17 is a sexual free speech
case, decided six to three, invalidating a federal statute.' 8 As part
provision of tuition assistance to students and families of students who attend
private schools. The effect of the decision, in this Cleveland case, is that almost
all the students would be attending religious schools. The Court held that this
program did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2473.
12 See Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 165; Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258;
BE & K Constr., 536 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2395; Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360;
Republican Party, 536 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
13 See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 325-26; Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 535 U.S. 566 (2002); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 429; Zelman, 536 U.S.
at 122 S. Ct. at 2462-63 (2002).
-See Zelman, 536 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2461 (writing for the majority
Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., writing
for the dissent Souter, J., in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined);
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 359 (writing for the majority O'Connor, J., joined by
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and Souter, JJ., writing for the dissent, Breyer, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, CJ., Ginsburg and Stevens, JJ.); Republican Party, 536
U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2530 (announcing the majority decision of the court,
Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., Thomas, Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting opinions written by Stevens J., and Ginsburg, J., joined in both by
Souter and Breyer, JJ.); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 428 (delivering the opinion
of the majority of the court, O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy, JJ., writing for the dissent, Souter, J., joined by
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens, JJ.).
5 Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.
16 Souter, J., Ginsberg, J., Breyer,.J., Stevens, J.
17 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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of Congress' ongoing concern with child pornography, Congress
passed a statute, the Child Pornography Protection Act, (CPPA), 19
which took the regulation of child pornography to a new level. At
the time the statute was passed, it extended federal law against
child pornography to virtual child pornography.2 0  It was a new
concept. Congress was saying that if you digitally create material
that depicts youngsters involved in sexual activity, virtual child
pornography, you could be punished federally, as if you had
photographed real youngsters involved in sexual activity. 21  The
Supreme Court said this statute goes too far.22
In New York v. Ferber,23 decided almost twenty years ago,
the prosecution of those who possessed, distributed, or produced
materials where actual underage children were used to create those
materials, was based on a theory of child exploitation.24 The
reasoning at that time was that the material was produced by
exploiting and abusing children and therefore, in order to prevent
that exploitation and abuse, it would be necessary to dry up. the
market for that material.
2 5
The issue was always based on a child abuse rationale.
26
When you do not use children, but you have digitally created or
artificially created images, there are no children that have been
exploited or abused. Therefore, in Free Speech Coalition, the
statute went well beyond the rationale of the Ferber case and that
1" 535 U.S. at 238 ("Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. O'connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J.,
joined as to Part II. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia,
J., Ioined except for the paragraph discussing legislative history.").
Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3501 (1996) (codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(2000)).
20 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (8) (B), (D). Virtual child pornography is artificially
created or digitally created, to look like a person under sixteen, but does not
involve the use of any real youngster to create the material. Id.
21 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 245.
22 Id. at 252-53.
23 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
24 Id. at 757.
25 Id. at 760.
26 Id. at 753.
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is what the Supreme Court held.27 The material, by definition, did
not meet the famous three-part test of the Miller case. 28  Only
material that meets the Miller test can be punished as obscene.29
Virtual child pornography deals with sexual content, but it is not
hard core pornography or obscenity under the Miller test.3 ° So in
order to justify that statute, having lost on the Ferber theory,3 1
because there were no children actually being abused, the
government argued in the alternative that the use of virtual child
pornography would have three effects that the government was
entitled to prohibit.
32
First, virtual pornography would facilitate the seduction of
young children. 33 Second, it would incite adults to be interested in
abusing young children in a real world sense.34  Third, because
virtual child pornography is so realistic, it would be difficult to tell
whether a video was made with a child or made virtually
(digitally), therefore, it would be hard to prosecute creators of real
child pornography.
35
To all three claims the Court answered with a variant of the
old "clear and present danger" concept,36 namely, it is necessary to
27 535 U.S. at 256.
28 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The three-part test defining
obscenity in Miller is: (1) "That conduct must be specifically defined by the
applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed." (2) A state
offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the
prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way," and (3) "[T]aken as a whole, [it] do[es] not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." Id. at 24.29 Id. at 24.
30 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246. The Court reasoned that "The
CPPA prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. The statute proscribes the visual depiction of an idea -- that of teenagers
engaging in sexual activity -- that is a fact of modem society and has been a
theme in art and literature throughout the ages." Id.
31 Id. at 251. The Court held that "the speech is neither obscene nor the
product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First
Amendment." Id.
32 Id. at 250-54.
331 d. at 251.
14 Id. at 253.
35 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 254.
36 Id. at 253-54 ("The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
[Vol 19
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show that the use of this material for seduction purposes or for
excitement purposes causes people to be more interested in child
abuse.37  Further, it is essential to show that digitally created
material poses a sufficient danger in bringing about real harms to
real children in order to justify the prohibition of digitally created
material.38
This is an important First Amendment decision as it once
again limits the ability of government to outlaw speech because the
government claims that the speech may bring about real world
harm. 39 Indeed, the Court cited its current clear and present danger
case, Brandenburg v. Ohio,40 a case where the Court held that only
where speech incites imminent lawless action and is highly likely
to bring that action about, can speech be limited.4 1 The Court in the
instant case concluded that the rationale for this statute failed those
requirements. 42 Therefore the Court held that a ban on the creation
of virtual child pornography was offensive to the First
Amendment.43
ASHCROFT v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,44 the second
major federal case involving sexual content, caused the Court
much more difficulty. This case involved the Child Online
Protection Act, (COPA),45 similar to, but different from the
CPPA46 just discussed in the Free Speech Coalition case.
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.") (citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (quoting Schenck v. U.S., 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919))).
" Id. at 252-53.
38 id.
39 id.
40 395 U.S. 444.
41 Id. at 447.
42 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258.
43 id.
44 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
41 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000)).
46 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (including virtual pornography).
2002
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The Child Online Protection Act prohibits the use of the
worldwide web to communicate information for commercial
purposes that would be available to any minor when that
information includes material that is harmful to minors.47 As
background to this case, in the mid-1990's, Congress passed the
so-called Communications Decency Act,48 which was an effort to
restrict sexual content on the Internet. In a rather resounding
defeat for the government, the Supreme Court, in Reno v. ACLU,
declared that the Communications Decency Act was overbroad; it
went well beyond the government's valid areas of concern with
obscenity, or with the presentation and location of sexual material
and fell short of being prohibited obscenity.49
In response to this holding, Congress fashioned a new
solution. Congress enacted the new statute, the Child Online
Protection Act, which was indeed more narrowly drawn to meet
some of the concerns that the Court raised in Reno when it struck
down the Communications Decency Act. 51 The narrowing features
of COPA include: (1) the statute is limited to the worldwide web,52
(2) the statute only addresses material that would be harmful to
minors, 53 and (3) the statute includes a diluted three-part Miller54
47 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).
48 Id. § 223(a) (d) (Supp II 1996) (repealed 1998). The CDA prohibited
displaying or transmitting obscene messages to minor persons and was enacted
as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
5047 U.S.C. § 231.
51 Reno, 521 U.S. at 874. The Court stated:
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the
First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content
of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be
at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the
statute was enacted to serve.
Id.
52 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(1). This statute did not include, for example,
communications on e-mail. It also only pertained to commercial speakers,
which would exclude most academic or personal communications.
" Id. § 231(e)(6).
14 Miller, 413 U.S at 24.
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test, ("Miller-lite"), that has to be met in order to allow
punishment.5
The feature that drew the most interest was the use of the
three-part "Miller-lite" formula, now run through the filter of
community standards. 56  The last of these narrowing features
would present the greatest problem. A web site could be located
on 42nd Street in Manhattan, but can be accessible from
Greenville, South Carolina and any other place where access to the
Internet is available. For the material to fall within the meaning of
the statute, the material would have to have sexual content, but
whether it violates community standards, in terms of the sexual
material, and is thus harmful to minors, would depend on which
community is the measuring community? Is it Manhattan,
Greenville, or some abstract or hypothetical national community?
Essentially, the Third Circuit held in this case that the use
of any community standards test would violate the First
Amendment because web publishers have no way of avoiding
liability under current technology, so they must engage in self-
censorship.57 The lower court also noted the chilling effect that
that kind of standard would evoke. 58 The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court's decision.59 Although there was no majority
opinion for the Court, there are four different points of view that
can be found through various plurality,60 concurring, 61 and one
dissenting opinion.
62
What the Court agreed upon, or at least most of the
Justices63 agreed upon, was that there could be a community
standards' filter through which material found on the world wide
web, that might be harmful to children, could be judged.64 The
47 U.S.C. § 23 l(e)(6).561d.
57 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 1999).
" id. at 177.
59Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 586.
6 id.
61 Id. at 586-602.
62 Id. at 602-12.
63 Id. at 566. Thomas, O'Connor, Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
Rehnquist, and Scalia, JJ.
6535 U.S. at 581 (citing Sable Comm. V. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
2002
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Court concluded that it was not a First Amendment violation per se
to use a community standards' test.
65
The central issues that the Court disagreed on were: should
there be a local community standard or a national community
standard?; 66 how should a community standard be measured?;
7
and most significantly, what effect in the real world would this
community standard have on speakers and communicators on the
Internet? 68 To address these concerns, the Court remanded the
entire matter to the Third Circuit to pursue all of the factual
questions and to apply the First Amendment to this situation.69
Justice Stevens was the only justice who thought that the
statute was an absolute violation of the First Amendment. 7' He
filed the only dissent. He expressed concern that the community
standards' notion had been created as a shield to protect the First
Amendment.7 1 Justice Stevens reasoned that if your community
was Manhattan, New York, then you had more latitude to produce
material appropriate for that community. 72  The community
standard was designed to enhance freedom of sPeech standards.
Its purpose was to be a shield, not a sword. Justice Stevens
further reasoned that communities such as Greenville, South
Carolina, are less liberated than, perhaps, Manhattan, however, the
lowest common denominator of those community standards might
65 Id. at 580 (stating that there is no violation when the statute's scope is
narrowed by a "serious value" prong as well as a "prurient interest" prong). The
primary opinion that supports this position was a plurality opinion written by
Justice Thomas. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in the opinion. Id.
66 Id. at 583.
67 Id. at 579.
68 Id. at 583.
69 535 U.S. at 586. This case has not been decided as of this writing.
70 535 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 603.
72 Id. at 607-08. The Third Circuit, on remand, decided on March 6, 2003 that
COPA restricted free speech because the statute barred Web page operators
from posting information inappropriate for minors unless they limited the sites
to adults. Relying on the hypothetcial approach used in Ashcroft v. ACLU, the
court reasoned that in seeking to define material harmful to minors, the law
made no distinction between things inappropriate for a 5-year old and things
harmful to someone in their early teens. ACLU, No. 99-1324, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4152, at *38 (3d. Cir. Pa. Mar. 6, 2003).
" Id. at 603.
74 id.
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apply to all materials, and that would be a deprecation of First
Amendment values.
75
CITY OF Los ANGELES V. ALAMEDA BooKs
The case of City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books76 also
involved sexual material, but in the context of a local ordinance, in
contrast to the above-cited cases77 that involved federal statutes. In
Young v. American Mini Theaters,78 the Court held that stores or
places which purvey sexual material that is not obscene79 but is
only sexual in nature, can be regulated by the use of zoning laws.
80
Zoning laws do not violate the First Amendment rights of such
establishments when the community has concern about the
secondary effects of such places: crime, prostitution, drug use and
the like.8' Many communities, such as New York City," passed
zoning laws, which state that places that deal with adult material
can not be within five hundred feet of each other83 or within five
hundred feet of a school or a religious facility.
84
The issue in the case was what happens when a city utilizes
zoning laws based on a study of bad effects from the concentration
of adult-only facilities and then later becomes cognizant that many
of those facilities have, in fact, moved under one roof.8 5 One of
the issues in this case is, can the community pass a new ordinance,
which would limit the number of such facilities to one per
7 535 U.S. at 608-09.
76 535 U.S. 425.
77 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564; Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
78 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
79See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (stating that if
material is obscene, it could be made a crime to purvey and the establishment
could be shut down).
go Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
8' id. at 71 n.34.
82 New York City, N.Y., Commercial District Regulations, Art. III § 32-
01(2002) available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art03.pdf (last
visited April 29, 2003).
83 Id. § 32-01(c).
84 Id. § 32-01(b).
85 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 431.
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building? 86 What kind of proof would be needed to prove that that
kind of "mini-mall" phenomenon has caused new secondary effect
problems?
87
The Supreme Court, in a five-four opinion 88 held that (1) a
community could rely on the original report that was the basis for
the zoning of sexually-oriented places and (2) a community could
rely on anecdotal reports and evidence of the harm that was
created. 89 This opinion is significant in that a city or county
attorney who is seeking to resist a summary judgment motion
striking down an ordinance like this on First Amendment grounds
is only required to present the concerns that prompted the
community to enact ordinances like this in the first instance. 90
A five justice majority held that a minimum of evidentiary
support is needed to justify, or at the least, require, that a trial be
held to determine if the dispersal of multiple uses within one
facility is something that is justified under the First Amendment. 9'
The four dissenters, Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Stevens, and
Breyer held that this kind of low level scrutiny of the justifications
that local government had put forward to sustain this zoning
ordinance, was not the kind of scrutiny that should be required
even when regulating sexually-oriented material.92 This decision
can be seen as a loss for First Amendment rights.
86 Id. There is one building that had an adult bookstore, a video store, and
perhaps a massage parlor, sort of a tri-fecta.
87 Id. at 433.
88 Id. at 428. O'Connor, J. wrote an opinion in which Rehnquist, C.J. and
Thomas, J. joined. Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ. filed concurring opinions. Souter,
J. dissented, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.
" Id. at 442.
90 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 442.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 465-66. The dissent stated:
Whereas Young and Renton gave cities the choice between
two strategies when each was causally related to the city's
interest, the plurality today gives Los Angeles a right to
"experiment" with a First Amendment restriction in response
to a problem of increased crime that the city has never even
shown to be associated with combined bookstore-arcades
standing alone. But the government's freedom of
experimentation cannot displace its burden under the
intermediate scrutiny standard to show that the restriction on
[Vol 19
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THOMPSON V. WESTERN STATES MEDICAL CENTER
In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,93 the
94decision was also five-four, but in reverse. This case involved a
federal statute95 restricting the advertising by pharmacists of
certain types of compound drugs. 96  Congress allowed the
dispensing of these customized drugs without the normal
experimental phase, but, in exchange, banned the advertisement of
these drugs or the dissemination of information that the
pharmaceutical industry is willing to create such drugs.97  The
rationale behind this agreement was that Congress did not want the
demand for customized drugs to become a large-scale market,
although Congress did want the drugs to remain available. The
legislative intent was to keep use of customized drugs as an avenue
of last resort, by keeping the advertising of the availability of such
drugs to a minimum.98
Pharmacists and others who wanted the ability to inform
the public, both doctors and patients, of their ability to create
customized individual prescriptions and compound prescriptions,
challenged this restriction." In a five to four decision the Supreme
Court held that the restriction violated the First Amendment.l°°
For many years, there has been a concerted effort to get the
Court to not use the so-called four-part formula of the Central
Hudsonl0' case for judging the validity of a restriction on
speech is no greater than essential to realizing an important
objective, in this case policing crime.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
93 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
94 Id. at 360 (holding that the statutory provision was an unconstitutional
restriction of protected First Amendment commercial speech).
9' 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2000).
9 535 U.S. at 360. Compound drugs are drugs that are customized by
pharmacists to meet the individual needs of individual patients.
97 Id. at 364-65 (articulating the consequences of 21 U.S.C. § 353a(c)).
9' Id. at 366.
9id. at 365.
'oo Id. at 360.
lot Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (announcing the four part test as follows: whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment; whether the asserted government interest is
2002
TOURO LAWREVIEW
commercial speech, as opposed to political speech. 0 2 In this case,
the Court recognized no need to examine that issue. The Court
held that, by simply using the four-part test, the restriction violated
the First Amendment. 10 3 The Court validated Congress' goal to
insure that untested combinations of drugs are not to be prescribed
indiscriminately. °4  Further, the Court saw the need for
pharmacists to be able to communicate to doctors and patients. 10 5
In turn, if there is some risk that doctors will want to prescribe
such drugs, that is a reasonable choice, so long as patients are
informed. Just because doctors and patients can make a bad choice
or a wrong choice is not enough reason to withhold information. 10 6
The Court focused on the regulatory issues 10 7 and apparently was
not convinced that the means, a total ban on advertising of
compound drugs, chosen by the legislature, was properly tailored
to the valid goal of prescription drug safety. 0 8  The dissenters
included Justice Breyer, a former Senate chief legislative
counsel, 10 9 who tends to be partial toward Congressional
regulations, particularly those affecting business, and who would
have upheld the regulation. 110 Two justices who are normally
liberal, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, joined Justice Breyer."'
The fourth dissenter, Chief Justice Rehnquist, is a long-time
opponent of strong protection for commercial speech." 2 In the
substantial; whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest;
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest).
102 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring). This movement, led
by Justice Thomas, seeks to give commercial speech almost the same amount of
protection as political speech.
'
03 Id. at 360.
"o4Id. at 369.
"OS Id. at 375 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Commuter Council,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
106 Id. at 374.
107 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 375-76.
'
0 8 Id. at 370-71.
109 See Justice Breyer's biography available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited on April 29, 2003).
10 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 389.
' Id. at 378.
112 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Los Angeles
Police Dep't v. United Reporting Pub., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
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dissent, liberals and conservatives joined in their desire to uphold
this government regulation of commercial speech."1 3
There is an old joke that "The problem with commercial
speech is that liberals do not like it because it is commercial, and
conservatives do not like it because it is speech." Despite this
adage, there was a majority opinion that protected commercial
speech.
THOMAS V. CHICAGO PARK DIsTRICT
Thomas v. Chicago Park District,114 was the only
unanimous vote on the First Amendment docket last term. This
case is an example of the limitations in reasoning by analogy.
In this case, the Chicago Park District instituted a rather
elaborate, but careful, permit scheme;1 5 a statute that necessitated
those who intended to have a rally, march, or parade had to apply
for a permit. 1 6 It appears that one would be hard pressed to find
any sort of content basis for denying a permit. It definitely
appeared to be a classic time, place, and manner concern. 11
7
Nonetheless, a group that had been denied a permit to hold
rallies protesting laws against marijuana use challenged the denial
of a permit. 11 The group filed an action challenging the park
permit statute. The action relied on a line of cases associated with
Freedman v. Maryland,1 9 which held that if a municipality formed
a governing unit which licensed and censored movies, and there
was a need to obtain a permit prior to showing the movie, the
municipality must provide procedural safeguards designed to
113 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist,
CJ., Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ).1,4 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
.
5 Id. at 318.116 id.
17 Id. at 323 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)). The public
forum doctrine empowers municipalities to give consideration, without unfair
discrimination, to time, place, and manner in relation to the other proper uses of
the streets. Id.
11 Thomas, 534 U.S. at 319-20.
119 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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obviate the dangers of a censorship system.'120 The challengers tothe Chicago Park District statute said the sam e chof a park
permit scheme.
The Court rejected this analogy. 12 1  Justice Scalia
differentiated censoring movies and the denial of a park permit. 122
When censoring movies, the essence of the prior permit scheme iscensorship. 12 3 The scheme for denial of a permit to show a movieis content based. With movies, we do not want the censors to have
the last word, we want quick and fair judicial procedures. In the
instant case, there is no censorship law. 124 Therefore, the movie
censorship board case 125 is really inapposite and this is a valid
classic time, place, and manner regulation. 26 The only possible
free speech question that will remain would be w her in the
enforcement of this valid regulation there is a pattern of unlawful
favoritism. 12 o The Court suggested that if the petitioners could
prove that dissenting points of view never get a permit, but main
street points of view always get a permit, then there would beevidence of a "pattern of unlawful favoritism," and that would be
an appropriate issue to bring before the Court.' 2 8 In terms of this
facial challenge to the park permit statute, however, it failed, andthe statute was upheld as valid under the First Amendment. 129
120 Id. at 58. The necessary safeguards would include strict time limits to
insure judicial review. Furthermore, "[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of afinal judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with
sound judicial resolution." Id. at 59.12 1 Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322.
122 id.
123 d,
124 Id.
125 Freedman, 380 U.S. 51.
126 Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322.
127 Id at 323.
'28 Id at 325.
129 id.
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WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK V.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
The case of Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New
York v. Village of Stratton,'30 can be classified as a great old
chestnut of First Amendment law. Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society is a Jehovah's Witness religious group. 131 As a person
who works in downtown Brooklyn, I can attest to their prominence
within our community. They are also extremely prominent in
Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence. 32 The Court
actually mentions in the opinion the role that Jehovah's Witnesses
have played in First Amendment rights' litigation. 133 Their
religious doctrine requires them to proselytize, go door-to-door, or
go out in the public arena to proclaim their religion.'
34
As a result of this religious requirement, for almost a
century they have run afoul of various local ordinances designed to
restrict speech on the streets,1 35 restrict the distribution of leaflets
on the streets, 136 and restrict the going of door-to-door, home-to-
home. 137  The Jehovah Witnesses have consistently challenged
these ordinances. They have received favorable rulings by the
courts. In this case, the city required that any person or group,
religious, political, selling pots and pans, or magazine
subscriptions had to obtain a permit from the mayor's office.1
38
The Supreme Court held, surprisingly, that it would be
impermissible for a municipality to require a permit for going
door-to-door. 139 The Court said that in each of the previous cases
there was some flaw in the regulation, therefore each particular
130 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
131 Id at 153.
132 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S, 296 (1940).
133 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 160.
134 Id at 160-61.
135 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
136 See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
37 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
138 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 156.
139 Id. at 169.
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scheme was held to be unconstitutional.' 40 In this case, the Court
simply held that you could not have a permit requirement for going
door-to-door. 141
First, the Court reasoned that it would deter speakers. 42
Justice Stevens,-who has a real soft spot for the little guy, once
wrote a very strong First Amendment opinion upholding a right to
put a n on your front lawn proclaiming your political
position.' 3 Second, in another case, Justice Stevens viewed the
Internet as a little guy's medium. 144 Third, Justice Stevens also
believed that going door-to-door was a little guy's method of
communication. 145 He did concede there was no censorship issue
in requiring that one complete a form to get a permit, but he did
opine that this permit requirement was too much of a strain on First
Amendment values of anonymous speech, spontaneous speech,
and the medium of door-to-door speech. 1
46
Thus, the Court held that the gain to the homeowner and
the community in terms of safety and freedom from fraud was just
not worth the price of putting this blanket permit requirement on a
pristine form of First Amendment activity. 147 By a vote of eight to
one, the Court struck down a prior approval permit requirement for
door-to-door canvassing. 148 The Court did express its concern for
safety and fraud, but offered that there are other ways to deal with
those issues. 149 The lone dissenter was Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who appeared very upset with the decision. He cited the terrible
tragedy that occurred to the Dartmouth College professor and his
wife, who were murdered by two young teenagers who came to
their door pretending to be conducting a survey and came into their
140 See, e.g., Marsh, 326 U.S. at 504-05; Martin, 319 U.S. at 144; Cantwell,
310 U.S. at 303; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111.
141 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 166.
142 id.
143 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
144 Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (stating that the intemet "enables tens of millions of
people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of
information from around the world.").
141 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 163 (quoting Martin, 319 U.S. at 144-46).
146 Id at 162-63.
147 Id at 165.
14 1 Id at 152.
149 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 168-69 (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 494 U.S. 620, 639 (1980)).
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home and murdered them.1 50 Chief Justice Rehnquist almost
implied that the Court would have blood on its hands from this
holding. 51 He appeared almost obsessed with this issue when he
mentioned the Dartmouth murders three times in his dissent. 152 In
any event, Justice Stevens writing for the majority thought it was
too remote a risk to be overly concerned about and, more
importantly, to justify this blanket restriction of First Amendment
rights.1
53
BE&K CONSTRUCTION Co. v. NLRB
BE&K Construction v. NLRB 154 is mostly a labor regulation
case, but it is also a First Amendment case. What had occurred
was a company in dispute with a labor union filed a lawsuit against
the union charging various unfair labor practices. 155 The union
then filed an unfair labor charge against the company for having
filed the lawsuit.' 56 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
sustained the union's charge.' 57  The issue of this case was: is
going to court a First Amendment protected right? 58 The Court
had long held that to petition the government for redress, as in
litigation, is part of your right to petition as well as your right to
speak.' 59 Therefore, a company or business that goes to court and
150 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (referring to
Pamela Ferdinand, Dartmouth Professors Called Random Targets; Indictment:
Teens Sought Bank Codes, WASH. POST, February 20, 2002, at A2).
I"l Id. at 173.
152 Id at 172-73, 177, 179.
153 Id at 167-68.
154 536 U.S. 516, 122 S. Ct. 2390 (2002).
155 Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2393.
156 Id. at , 122 S. Ct. at 2394.
17 Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2395.
' id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2395.
1'9 BE & K Constr., 536 U.S. 516, __ 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2396 ("We have
recognized this right to petition as one of the 'most precious of the liberties
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights."') (quoting Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar
Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)). The Supreme Court held that freedom of
speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by First and Fourteenth Amendments
gave a union a right to hire an attorney on a salary basis to assist its members in
assertion of their legal rights with respect to processing of worker's
compensation claims. Id.; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
552 (1876).
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asserts a nonbaseless claim against a competitor, or against
someone they are in an adverse context with, cannot be subject to
regulatory punishment because of filing a valid, even though
ultimately, unsuccessful lawsuit against their adversary.' 60
This holding expands the First Amendment right to petition
to now include the right to speak through litigation in the context
of a labor dispute.'61
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 162 and Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris163 are the most significant decisions of this Term
of the Supreme Court. I predict that in future years, these two
cases will have the most impact on our country.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White is a case involving
elections for judicial office and the restriction of speech that can be
uttered by judicial candidates during judicial elections. 164  The
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a canon of judicial conduct that
prohibits a 'candidate for a judicial office' from 'announc[ing]
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.' '165 A
candidate for Associate Justice challenged this canon and
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.166 The
issue presented was whether such a restriction on the speech of
judicial candidates for elective judicial office is a violation of the
First Amendment.' 67  The Court held in a conservative-liberal,
five-four split that this restraint was a violation of the First
Amendment. 1
68
The reasoning of the Court, as expressed in an opinion
delivered by Justice Scalia, was that if there are going to be
160 BE & K Constr., 536 U.S. at, 122 S. Ct. at 2401.
161 Id. The right to litigate is protected by a number of amendments. See, e.g.,
U.S. Const. amend. VII; U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
162 536 U.S. 765, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
163 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002). See discussion infra at notes 181-
212.
164 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at , 122 S. Ct. at 2531.
165 Id at , 122 S. Ct. at 2531.
66 Id. at __ 122 S. Ct. at 2532.
167 Id. at 122 S. Ct. at 2531.
161 Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
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elections it is imperative that the candidates talk about the issues of
the election. 69  The opinion points to a tension between
Minnesota's law requiring elections of judges rather than
appointing them and such a First Amendment restriction.17 0 The
Court did recognize the impropriety and conflict of interest of a
judge asserting promises of how he or she would decide a specific
case. 171 Nonetheless, beyond that, discussions of views on areas of
law or issues of law cannot be banned in an election context.'
72
One might ask for the rationale behind such a decision.
The Court offered that the people who are making the ultimate
decision in an election, the voters, have a right to know what the
candidates feel about pertinent issues. 173 If a candidate chooses to
run a campaign critical of the court or run on a platform supportive
of the court, the voters have a right to know what kind of candidate
is asking to be elected and what kind of views that candidate has
on general constitutional issues.1 74  The basic premise of the
Court's opinion is that under the First Amendment, you cannot
have an election without allowing the candidates to discuss the
issues of the election.
1 75
The dissenters argued that this concept of an open dialogue
between candidates for political offices, executive and legislative
offices, is imperative, but elections for judicial offices are
different.' 76  Justice Stevens observed that it is better to have
elections for judges with some restrictions, than to have wholly
appointed justices, where there is no democratic input, or
conversely, elections with no restrictions whatsoever. 77 Thus, the
169 Republican Party, 536 U.S at -, 122 S. Ct. at 2538.
70 Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2541.
.7 Id. at 122 S. Ct. at 2537.
7 Id. at __ 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
1 Id. at 122 S. Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'74 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2541. Ironically, New
York's liberal Senator Charles E. Schumer has quoted Justice Scalia in order to
justify the Senator's attempt to ascertain the views of President George W.
Bush's appointees for the federal bench.
7 Id. at __ 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
176 Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2551 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Stevens was joined in
this opinion by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg also
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined.
Id. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2546.
77 Id. at 
_, 122 S. Ct. at 2548.
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dissenters concluded that this focused restraint on a candidate not
being able to talk about her views on disputed legal or political
issues is a good price to pay for continuing to hold elections for
judicial offices. 171
This case is pivotal in that it clearly sets forth the Court's
view on political speech restrictions. In the coming term, the
Court will probably grant review of a case involving a challenge to
the new campaign finance law.179  Republican Party of
Minnesota180 gives us some indication of how some of the Justices
view restrictions on political campaign speech.
ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris'8 1 was a closely watched case
involving school vouchers in the City of Cleveland. It was
previously before the Sixth Circuit. 82  The issue raised relates
closely to President Bush's interest in "faith-based" organizations
involving themselves in traditional government programs and
services. The thought in some circles and concern in other
circles is that this opinion may open the door to more "faith-based"
traditional government programs and services. 
184
The Cleveland school voucher program is a program
whereby the state appropriates funds to be used by parents to pay
for tuition for children attending private schools, including
parochial schools.' 85  Indeed, most of the parents who took
18 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2557-58 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
179 McConnell v. Federal Election Committee, No. 02-0582 (D. D.C. Mar. 27,
2002) (involving a wholesale constitutional challenge to the provisions of the
McCain-Feingold law).
"'0 536 U.S. 765, 122 S. Ct. 2528.
181 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
182 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
183The author extrapolates a connection between Zelman and President Bush's
platform on faith-based initiatives. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, The Supreme
Court: Religious Programs; Voucher Ruling Seen as Further Narrowing
Church-State Division, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at A24. Zelman, 536 U.S. at
,122 S. Ct. at 2462.
-84 See, e.g., Jason S. Marks, What Wall? School Vouchers and Church-State
Separation After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 58 J. Mo. B. 354 (2002).
18' Zelman, 536 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2463.
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advantage of this program did have children who attended
parochial schools.186  Benefits were also provided to students
attending certain public schools. 187  This feature of the school
voucher program or tuition subsidy program, made it more
palatable to the five Majority Justices, and certainly to Justice
O'Connor's crucial vote.
1 8
The Court utilized a bifurcated test to decide whether this
government program constitutes an improper establishment of
religion. 89 The first arm of the test, is what is the purpose of the
program; is it to benefit religion? 90 The second arm of the test is
whether the effect of the program is to benefit religion?' 91 In
Zelman the Court held that the purpose of the voucher program is
to benefit children who are suffering in one of the worst
educational systems in the country, a system that was taken over
by the state legislature by Federal court order. 192 Therefore, the
purpose of the program is a critical one, to improve education.
193
As to the effect of this program on the establishment of religion,
the Court held that this program does not have a religious effect for
two reasons. First, because it is neutral as to religion; it provides
benefits of tuition assistance, regardless of what kind of private
school a child goes to. 194 The program also provides subsidies or
benefits for children who attend public schools in the suburban
areas surrounding Cleveland. 195 Thus, the Court held that the
program itself is neutral as to religion and therefore undercuts the
notion that its effects are to benefit religion. 196 Second, parents
exercise free choice. 197 This is a program where it is the individual
parents, not the government, who are directing the benefits of the
86 Id. at, 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
87 id.
188 Id. at, 122 S. Ct. at 2473 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
joined this opinion.
'9 Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2467.
90 Zelman, 536 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2466.
19 Id. at 122'S. Ct. at 2466.
19 2 Id. at, 122 S. Ct. at 2467-68.
193 id.
194 Id. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
195 Zelman, 536 U.S. at__, 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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available resources toward a religious, secular, or public school
education. 198
The Court cited three cases to support this proposition.
About twenty years ago, in Mueller v. Allen, the Court upheld a
program providing a tuition tax deduction for education expenses
of all parents. 199 There were two other cases involving special
education benefit funding; in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind, vocational training,20 0 and in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, training for a disabled
student. 20 1 In both cases government funding was used to enable a
student to attend a religious institution.20 2 The Court upheld those
benefits on the ground that they were both neutral toward religion
and involved free choice by the individual who was the beneficiary
of the program, not a compulsion or a direction by the
government.
Relying on this reasoning in Zelman, the Supreme Court
conservative majority held that the voucher program did not
violate the Establishment Clause despite its result that the State
paid money to private schools as well as religious schools. 20 4 The
Court further considered that the funds were paid as part of a larger
education program. 20
5
The four dissenters, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer thought otherwise.20 6 They proposed that the new standard
of neutrality and free choice were too minimal in terms of
protecting Establishment Clause values.20 7 The dissent was
particularly taken by the fact that fifty years ago in a case called
Everson v. Board of Education,208 the Court held that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the use of public funds to support
198 Id. at , 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
199 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983).
200 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986).
20' 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
202 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3-4; Witters, 474 U.S. at 482.
203 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14, Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88.
204 Zelman, 536 U.S. at -, 122 S. Ct. at 2467-68 (majority opinion); id. at,
122 S. Ct. at 2473 (O'Connor, J., concurring).205Id. at __ 122 S. Ct.at 2482.
106 Id. at __ 122 S. Ct. at 2485.
207 Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2490.
208 330 U.S. 855 (1947).
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religious education. 209 Now, in effect, the Court sustained the use
of public funds to support religious education and that is a
violation both of the Everson principle and the Establishment
Clause on which it is based.21 ° What concerned the dissenters the
most was that, of the children who benefited from this program, an
overwhelming number of them were children who were attending
faith-based institutions. 211 Moreover, there was the sense that
those children in effect were coerced into doing so by the tuition
subsidy because they could not obtain anything resembling a
decent education in Cleveland public schools.212
When the Court upheld this voucher program, it set the
battlefield for future wars over government funding of faith-based
welfare programs. Future Courts will determine the final outcome.
CONCLUSION
This term witnessed a closely balanced and sharply divided
Court. A five-to-four schism for the First Amendment and a lot of
five-to-four decisions resulting. That delicate, difficult balance
may remain in the current Term as well.
209 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 2485 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).210 id.
21 Id. at, 122 S. Ct. at 2494.
2 12Id. at 
__ 122 S. Ct. at 2495.
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